Mahan and Mackinder

There are many geopolitical models trying to provide a framework for understanding how the international system works. But I want to explore Mahan and Mackinder because they are the two influencing top American and Chinese policy makers today.

Many tout the economic interdependence of the U.S, and China; they say that while there may be petty squabbles over things like farm tariffs, it will keep them from cold war or even hot war. In the long-run, the world’s two biggest economies are more prosperous with a symbiotic relationship.

The same things were said about Europe in the run-up to World War I. Prosperity matters. But it is just one important aspect of geopolitics. Security matters more.
And China and the U.S. are pursuing opposing national security strategies that set the stage for more than minor disputes.

What are those strategies?

Mahan and Rule the Waves

Alfred Thayer Mahan was a United States naval officer and the greatest strategist in American history. Writing in the late 19th Century when the United States was still a rising power, his book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 envisioned the U.S. as the geopolitical successor to the British Empire.

The British Empire was based on control of the seas and Mahan’s strategy focuses them: whomever controls the oceans controls the world since command of the sea guarantees security and trade. According to the United Nations, about 80 percent of global trade by volume is conducted by sea.

Mahan described the sea as a “great highway” and “wide common” with “well-worn trade routes” over which men pass in all directions.

But, he identified several narrow passages or strategic “chokepoints,” the control of which contributed to Great Britain’s command of the seas.

Control the seas and you can deliver your troops anywhere at any time. Control the seas and you can take the battle to the enemy’s heartland. Control the chokepoints and you can cut-off an enemy’s troop movements, supplies, communication and economy.

Therefore, the foundation of America’s national security had to be control of the seas.

The United States, he argued, can be threatened only by an enemy naval force that could both invade its territory and curb its access to the oceans. The most likely place for that enemy to come from is Eurasia.

Thus, the U.S. is geopolitically an island lying offshore Eurasia, and the greatest threat to its security is a hostile power or alliance of powers that gain effective political control of Eurasia. It is an American security imperative to ensure the geopolitical pluralism of Eurasia.

The American people lean toward isolationism. Mahan explains why American policy makers do not. And why the U.S. got involved in both World Wars despite initial reluctance.

Mahan also identified two potential rivals who might control of Eurasia.

In The Problem of Asia, Mahan urged policy makers to “glance at the map” of Asia and note “the vast, uninterrupted mass of the Russian Empire, stretching without a break from the meridian of western Asia Minor, until to the eastward it overpasses that of Japan.”

He envisioned an expansionist Russia needing to be contained by an alliance of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, which is precisely what happened to deal with the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1991.

Mahan also recognized the great power potential of China. In 1893, he wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times in which he recommended U.S. annexation of Hawaii as a necessary first step to exercise control of the North Pacific.

Should China “burst her barriers eastward,” he wrote, “it would be impossible to exaggerate the momentous issues dependent upon a firm hold of the Hawaiian Islands by a great civilized maritime power.”

Mahan described a future struggle for power in the area of central Asia he called the “debatable and debated ground,” and identified the “immense latent force” of China as a potential geopolitical rival.

Mahan knew that Western science and technology would at some point be globalized and wrote that under such circumstances, “It is difficult to contemplate with equanimity such a vast mass as the four hundred millions of China concentrated into one effective political organization, equipped with modern appliances, and cooped within a territory already narrow for it.”

Understand Mahan and you understand the American playbook for this century.

Makinder and Control of The Heartland

Halford Mackinder was a British geographer, academic and Member of Parliament. His seminal work, “The Geographical Pivot of History” was published in 1904.

Mackinder said whomever controlled the rich mineral and manpower potential in the vast area from the River Volga in Russia to the Yangtze River in China — which he called the Heartland — would control eventually control Eurasia and Africa — which he called the World Island — and ultimately control the world.

(In fact, Mackinder coined the term manpower)

Mackinder highlighted the Heartland’s rough terrain and brutal climate. Since Russia historically controlled much of the area, that and the backward Tsarist regime explained why it did not dominate the world. But Mackinder’s concern was who might realize the potential.

A non-Tsarist regime in Russia was one possibility, which presaged the Soviet Union. Though Leninism was little better than Tsarism at harnessing its promise.

Writing at the turn of the Twentieth Century, Mackinder thought the battle to control the Heartland would begin in Eastern Europe. He had his eye on rising Germany. If Germany controlled Eastern Europe, it would eventually control Russia, the Heartland, and the World Island. Mackinder was well read in Germany before both wars.

Many historians believe Mackinder was the inspiration behind Hitler’s Lebensraum - or move to the East policy — and his invasion of Russia during the Second World War.

Mackinder was also aware of China’s potential. In 1911 he wrote, “Whenever this great people decides to take full advantage of its resources, industry, communications and defense, it is inevitable that after one or two generations, China will count among the Great Powers of the world.”

That has happened. Since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms launched in 1989, China’s GDP has grown tenfold. Its military spending has kept pace.

China is making its presence felt globally. Mackinder helps today’s strategists grasp the momentous strategic implications of China’s cooperation with Russia, diplomatic and economic inroads into Africa, and growing sea power.

One Belt, One Road

China’s ultimate goals are encapsulated in the One Belt, One Road initiative, unveiled by Chinese President Xi Jinping in the fall of 2013.

One Belt refers to the overland development of new infrastructure like roads, rail, airports, pipelines, and communications to connect China’s interior provinces with Europe by way of Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East.

Go back to Mackinder. This would break the natural barriers that have kept anyone from realizing the abundant economic potential of the Heartland.

China’s foreign development model is imperialistic. The contracts go to Chinese companies with procurement from Chinese supply chains and projects built by Chinese labour.

This brings large numbers of Chinese, some of whom will never go home. This is a long-term Russian phobia in Siberia.

Debt trap diplomacy is another feature of Chinese projects.

China doesn’t give aid. It makes long-term loans that must be repaid. Beijing has been accused of intentionally extending excessive credit to debtor countries for dubious projects to extract political concessions from the debtor country when it becomes unable to honor its debt obligations.

A direct military play to seize control of the Heartland goes through nuclear Russia. That is unthinkable, without a technological military game changer like lasers. But China creating an economic monopoly in the Heartland is possible, and it would profoundly increase Beijing’s ability to project power throughout the world.

(That said, this is still one of the most politically unstable regions in the world. Ask yourself how much of your own money you’d be willing to invest in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan let alone Putin’s kleptocratic Russia, and you get an idea of the risk. One Belt could be a huge financial sinkhole for China, too.)

Power projection leads to “One Road,” the ambitious Chinese attempt to put in its sphere of influence the seas from the Western Pacific to the Eastern Indian Ocean, which would take it to the Middle East, Africa and Mediterranean.

This is being done with Chinese construction of ports in countries along maritime routes that are already used in seaborne trade. China has already seen this strategy pay some dividends, having been awarded contracts to build ports in Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka.

China is also engaged in a massive naval build-up.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy now has about 400 warships and submarines. By 2030, the Chinese navy could have more than 530 warships and submarines, according to a U.S. Naval War College projection.

A shrunken and overworked U.S. Navy, which has ruled the oceans virtually unchallenged since the end of the Cold War, had 288 warships and submarines at the end of March, according to the Pentagon.

While a rule of warfare is he who has more wins, naval effectiveness requires more than just boats; seamanship, precision and logistics are also necessary. The U.S. Navy demonstrated that recently when the USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier went into the South China Sea and put 20 F-18s in the sky in 20 minutes. Then quickly reset and did it again.

But just as the U.S. Navy once lagged Britain in expertise, China is building its capability.

Go back to Mackinder. Combined with the One Belt securing the Heartland, One Road is a play to control the World Island.

Now let’s revisit Mahan: the United States can be threatened only by an enemy naval force that could both invade its territory and curb its access to the oceans. The most likely source of that is a hostile power or alliance of powers that gained effective political control of Eurasia. Thus, it is an American security imperative to ensure the geopolitical pluralism of Eurasia.

If American strategy continues to follow Mahan and China Mackinder, they are on a collision course.