China Pulls Back In The Galwan Valley

This July 6 satellite image provided by Maxar Technologies shows the Galwan Valley along the disputed border between India and China. China and India appear to have dismantled recent construction on both sides of the border.

It appears China is attempting to repair its relations with India, after a deadly clash along the countries’ border on June 15 left 20 Indian and an estimated 40 Chinese troops dead.

Since May, Chinese forces have set-up more than 80 tents, established temporary defensive positions, and positioned reinforcements on the Indian side of the Galwan Valley. China’s best fighters and bombers have also been seen flying over the area.

But according to new satellite images, the People’s Liberation Army has withdrawn from the area. The photos, taken on Tuesday by Colorado-based satellite imagery company Maxar Technologies, appear to show that Chinese tents, vehicles, and troops previously stationed at strategic locations have pulled back, while a wall on the Indian side has gone.

The apparent withdrawal follows discussions on Sunday between China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian national security adviser Ajit Doval. Both sides stated their commitment to disengaging their troops along the Line of Actual Control after their discussion.

Previous satellite images appeared to show that Chinese soldiers had built temporary structures at Hot Springs and Gorga, two friction points in the disputed Galwan Valley area, but the new images show empty roads and no new construction or human activity in the forward area.

Images from June 28 (left) and July 6, (right) show that the Indians had built a wall on their side and the Chinese had expanded an outpost camp at the end of a long road connected to Chinese military bases, according to experts. The July 6 image shows China and India appear to have dismantled recent construction.

The Times of India, citing high-level sources in the India military, reported that there would be a three to four-week “stabilization” period when both sides would monitor each other and continue to meet to try to iron out problems. Other Indian media have said their troops have withdrawn 1.5km, and hoped to create a “buffer zone”.

The border dispute between the two countries dates back decades, with each occupying territory claimed by the other, and they cannot even agree on the precise location of the Line of Actual Control that serves as the effective frontier.

A statement released by the Chinese Foreign Ministry following the talks between Wang and Doval said both sides should not see each other as a threat.

But reality is, they do.

War on the Rocks published an excellent article that illuminates China’s thinking on India,

“Beijing sees the unsettled border as leverage to bog down India in the region and undermine its global potential. For China, the Chinese and Indian demands are different and asymmetrical by design. Key concessions India demands from China on the border settlement are hard commitments that cannot be reversed. By contrast, what China seeks from India, such as its neutrality in the U.S.-Chinese strategic competition, is ephemeral and easily adjustable. While New Delhi sees addressing the border issue as a prerequisite for India to trust China, Beijing doesn’t believe that relinquishing its leverage will in any way stop India from conducting hostile actions down the road, such as aligning with America to undermine Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean region.”

The last line is the key.

Look at a map. In a conflict, India is the best poised country in the world to cut off the flow of oil China needs from Middle East and minerals it gets from Africa. They don’t call it the Indian Ocean for nothing. That’s a legitimate Chinese concern.

That’s why for about 15 years, the U.S. has been trying to get India to join the Quad — a proposed alliance of itself, America, Japan and Australia to deal with Chinese ambitions.

What India needs to join the Quad is a reason.

Historically dubious of alliances generally and America specifically, India has been the most reluctant partner in the Quad. Yet, it’s the critical one because India is best positioned to cut off China from those essential resources. If the other three members don’t have to do that in a conflict, it gives them many more assets to use against China in the Pacific. And forces China to deploy many more of its own to the Indian Ocean.

As we showed in our article “Gun, Meet Foot: China’s Self-Defeating India Policy,” China keeps giving India reasons. The border clashes are just the tip of the iceberg.

China is attempting to encircle India with a series of naval bases in the Indian Ocean. It’s made inroads at Sittwe in Myanmar. It may soon secure naval access at Hambronata on the tip of Sri Lanka. And it already operates the port at Gwadar in Pakistan — where it may or may not already be building a naval base. Whatever the present status, it’s believed to be just a matter of time before the People’s Liberation Army Navy is stationed there.

That’s the tip of the iceberg in its budding friendship with Pakistan, the country that poses the most existential threat to India. In fact, the best place to invade India from is not through the Himalayas where the altitude, freezing temperatures and harsh terrain make a war not only logistically hard to sustain, it gives India myriad places to stop a Chinese invasion. It’s across India’s much more forgiving border with Pakistan.

With the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, a vast network of highways and railways which will run from Gwadar to China’s border, China is building the kind of access through Pakistan that could put its tanks and troops on India’s border in a day.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi laid out how New Delhi sees Beijing when he visited the area this week, "The age of expansionism is over. The world has moved on the path of development. The expansionist forces have ruined the world in the last century. But they have either been defeated or forgotten in history,"

Clearly, India will continue to move closer to the U.S. and the Quad.

Xi Jinping’s aggressive nationalism may play well at home. But it’s doing irreparable damage to China’s position abroad. The Galwan withdrawal is too little, too late.